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China's Domestic and International Policies on Global Warming: 
Explanations and Assessment1 
Paul G. HARRIS and YU Hongyuan 
Abstract: 
Global warming and resulting climate change present the world 
with major and potentially devastating challenges. China is among 
the countries that wiU suffer the 向伊cts of climate change. Although 
的 per capita emissions of pollutants causing global warming 
remain relatively low compared to the world's richest countries, 
China is now the second largest global polluter, and in coming 
decades it will overtake the United States as the world's largest 
polluter of the global atmosphere. How China responds to this 
problem has profound implications for its people, its neighbors and 
the world. China hαs joined with other countries in debating this 
issue, and it has started to implement programs and policies to 
reduce 的 emissions of so-called greenhouse gases. However, its 
domestic actions have rarely been motivated by concerns about the 
global impacts of climate change, and its response has been to avoid 
international regulation while waiting for the developed countries 的
act. Given th臼 response， short of radical change in politics and 
environment, it is unlikely that China will adeqωtely restrain its 
greenhouse gas emissions, thus mirroring - to the detriment of all -
the industrialization and growth of the world's wealthy countries. 
China has risen to become the Asian Pacific region's pre-eminent 
economic and political force. While it haS con仕ibuted to regional 
economic growth, it has simultaneously taken on the unenviable role 
of being the region's largest polluter. Among its new distinctions, 
China is now the second largest source - after the United States . of 
pollutants th剖 are warming the global atmosphere.2 A generation has 
passed since the world's governments began to seriously consider the 
problems of global warming and resulting climate change. 3 We 
know that global warming is caused by human activities - notably 
the buming of coal, oil and other fossil fuels - resulting in the 
emissions of carbon dioxide and other 'greenhouse gases' (GHGS).4 
Global warming in turn is causing climate change, which is 
manifested in rising sea levels, droughts, floods , spread of pests, 
harm to natural ecosystems and species, and other usually adverse 
consequences. As these impacts on environmental security have 
become c1earer, govemments have started to work unilaterally and in 
concert to adapt to and - much less robustly - mitigate c1imate 
change. 
The first decade of international cooperation on global 
warming resulted in the 1992 United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (FCCC), signed at the Rio Earth 
Summit. Subsequent intemational negotiations, notably those 
surrounding the 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the FCCC - which laid out 
very modest mandatory reductions in developed-country GHG 
emissions - and follow-on discussions regarding implementation 
have been fraught with difficulties and differences among countries. 
The countries of Asia Pacific have been important participants in 
these international negotiations. lndeed, they are crucial to global 
efforts to address climate change, if for no other reason than their 
economic growth has made them major emitters of greenhouse gases. 
Furthermore, Asia Pacific encompasses many of the developing 
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countries and peoples who will be most adversely affected by 
climate change.5 
F or those concemed about the environmental threats to human 
and national security, arguably the most important Asian Pacific 
country is China.6 China's population has reached about 1.3 billion 
people, and its economy is one of the world's largest and fastest 
growing. Consequently, China is experiencing widespread and often 
acute environmental problems with severe local, national and 
regional consequences.7 It already produces vast amounts of GHGs, 
especially carbon dioxide from the buming of fossil fuels (i.e. , coal, 
oil and natural gas). Due to its high economic development and low 
energy efficiency, in the early 1990s China became the world's 
second largest national source of GHGs, and it will become the 
largest source by about 2020.8 China is also important in the climate 
change debate because it is a leading member of the developing 
world, giving it political and diplomatic powers that enable it to 
influence intemational environmental negotiations. 
In other words, China is central to successful regional and 
global efforts to protect environmental security. Understanding its 
responses to global warming and climate change is important for 
scholars, practitioners and laypersons interested in global warming 
and other critical environmental problems. More broadly, 
understanding China's response to global warming can help 
illuminate the variables that shape the climate change policies of 
other countries within the region and beyond. From a narrow 
Chinese perspective, too, the harms done by climate change are 
potential and real environmental threats. Climate change has been 
recognized as a danger in China since the 1990s and has increasingly 
caught the atlention of China's leaders. Global warming may lead to 
sea level rise and some extreme weather events, which cause coastal 
flooding and damage in China. Global warming can lead to 
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environmental degradation and resource scarcities in China, 
particularly in water resources. It could also contribute to existing 
tensions in the region, increasing the potential for violent intra- and 
inter-state conflict.9 
With these considerations in mind, in this article we look at 
some of the consequences of climate change faced by Asia Pacific 
and particularly China. We describe China's domestic and 
intemational responses to this problem and a仕empt to explain them. 
Finally, we discuss some of the implications of China's response to 
climate change for environmental security in Asia Pacific. The 
upshot is that China is not doing enough, instead waiting on the rich 
countries of the world to take much more concerted action. To be 
sure, China has a strong ethical case for expecting the developed 
countries to act first. However, its fai1ure to act more robustly now 
may place it under greater moral scrutiny by future generations. 
Effects of Global Warming: Adversity for China and Asia 
Pacific 
The preponderance of evidence on global warming and climate 
change is very clear: climate change presents China and Asia-Pacific 
with m吋or challenges. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) has concluded that human activities are adding 
GHGs to the atmosphere, and that this is having a discemable impact 
by increasing global temper剖ures. 10 Overall, scientific predictions 
point to adverse global consequences, particularly in p訂ts of the 
world where geographic vulnerability and poverty make adaptation 
difficult or impossible. 11 The countries of Asia Pacific will not be 
immune to these changes, and in most cases they will be among the 
worst affected due to their vulnerable geographies and economies. 12 
What are the expected impacts of climate change in China and 
its region? Several research reports have anticipated the effects of 
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climate change for Asia. For example, the 2001 third assessment 
report of the IPCC argues that Asia is potentially more susceptible to 
climate change than are some other regions of the wor1d. 13 It 
concludes that the developing countries of Asia are highly 
vulnerable, and their adaptability is low. Floods, forest fires , 
cyclones, droughts and other extreme events have increased in 
temperate and tropical Asia. While agricultural productivity could 
increase in northem parts of Asia, food security would suffer in arid, 
tropical and temperate Asia due to reduced agricultural and 
aquaculture productivity from warmer water, sea-level rise, floods, 
droughts and cyclones. Water availability may decrease in arid and 
semi-arid Asia and possibly increase in northem Asia, and increased 
incidence of vector-bome diseases and heat-stress will threaten 
human health. Temperate and tropical Asia should anticipate 
increased rainfall and floods. Rising sea level and more intense 
storms could 'displace tens of millions of people in low-lying coastal 
areas of temperate and tropical Asia\14 Some parts of Asia will see 
adverse climate change effects on transp。此， increased demand for 
energy, and adverse impacts on tourism. Land-use and land-cover 
changes will threaten biodiversity, and sea-level rise will adversely 
impact coral reefs and mangrove areas that are important for 
fisheries. 
Climate change will likely cause - and may be causing already 
- many adverse impacts in China. 15 China may see greater weather 
extremes, including droughts in the north and floods in the south, 
and heat stroke and death will increase, as may occurrences of 
malaria, dengue fever and other diseases. 16 Hotter weather will 
increase heat-related mortality, as indicated by historical studies 
from China showing a strong correlation between peak summer 
temperatures and death rates. 17 Among other prominent impacts are 
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those to agriculture, forests , water resources, and impacts arising 
fmm rising seas-IB 
Climate change affects agriculture through impacts on crops, 
soils, insects, weeds, dise泊的， and livestock. 19 Thomas Schelling 
argues that China is 'dependent on agriculture and will therefore 
suffer much more from global warming than developed countries'?O 
If recent climate change trends continue, much of Chinese 
agriculture is likely to face shorter growing periods and increased 
water deficits, requiring more irrigation. Under these conditions, 
Chinese crop production, especially of wheat and com, could 
decrease by 10 percent by 2050. 21 In short, 'Possible impacts of 
climate change on Chinese agriculture could be highly disruptive\22 
F orest areas suffering 企om desertification in China are already 
increasing at a rapid rate, which wiU be exacerbated by climate 
change. 23 By 1998, the total area of desertification in China had 
reached 2.62 million square kilometers - over one-quarter of the 
country's surface area - and it is increasing at an annual rate of 6700 
square kilometers-24 
Most of China has experienced an average annual temperature 
increase of more than 1 degree Celsius in the last centu旬， mostly 
since the 1970s, with substantial warming expected in this century. 25 
Permafrost in northeast China is expected to disappear (releasinK 
methane, a potent GHG, adding to global warming) and glaciers will 
melt. Northem China is particularly vulnerable to expected changes 
in rainfall, exacerbating already-severe water shortages. 26 Climate 
change may also cause more floods in China. From 1950 to 1989 the 
area suffering from flood in China was about 8 million hectares 
annually, with that suffering 企om drought reaching 20 million 
hectares. Since 1990, the annual average area suffering from 
flooding has increased to about 22.7 million hectares. 27 These 
changes can be expected to continue with global warming. 
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Coastlines in China will be damaged by sea-level rise, as will 
aquifers inundated with salt water. China's 32,000-kilometer 
coastline is densely populated and highly developed. 2~ One study 
predicts that sea-level rise along China's coast will be 15-26 
centimeters by 2050, reaching 40-74 centimeters by 2100.29 lndeed, 
many of China's coastal areas will be under water if past and 
anticipated trends continue.30 
Overall, 70 percent of the Chinese people, as well as 80 percent 
of their industries, agriculture sector and cities, are alrea命 'seriously
threatened' by natural disasters.31 Millions of people have died 企om
such events, nearly one-third of government revenue is spent on 
fighting them, and up to 6 percent of GNP is lost as a result.32 These 
losses wiU only increase as climate changes. 
What comes 企om reports on the impacts of climate change in 
Asia Pacific is that many of the effects will be felt most by - and be 
most painful for - the developing countries of the region, including 
China, often because they are more vulnerable and less able to cope 
due to poverty and existing environmental problems and resource 
scarcltles. 
China's National Response to Global Warming 
Rapid econornic growth in China has been and wiU be associated 
with rapid increases in fossil fuel use, the primary source of carbon 
dioxide and the chief GHG. As a developing country, China is 
seeking to industrialize and rnodernize. Both economic activity and, 
to an even greater extent, energy dernands are currently expanding 
much faster than is typical of other countries. China's annual 
economic growth averaged 11 percent frorn 1978 to 1993 and is 
expected to continue at subsequent rates of about 8 percent annually 
to 2020.33 
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China faces a number of challenges in this respect. One of the 
most important is reducing the adverse environmental impacts 
associated with rapid economic growth in a coal-based economy. 
Few countries in the world depend on coal as heavily as China does. 
Coal accounts for 90 percent of China's fossil fuel resources, with 
coal consumption reaching 1.3 billion tons in 1995,34 accounting for 
80 percent of primary commercial energy demand. China's carbon 
dioxide emissions reached 800 million tons in 1995, ranking it 
second in the world after the United States. 35 If current trends 
continue, by 2020 China's average per capita energy consumption 
will match the current global average, meaning that China alone will 
account for almost one-third of the world's total GHG emissions 
between 1990 and 2020. 36 To be sure, China's current per capita 
emissions of GHGs are low compared to the industrialized countries, 
but with almost 1.3 billion people its aggregate contribution to 
global warming is huge and growing. This prospect becomes clear 
when one considers the burgeoning middle class in China, whose 
lifestyle choices will lead to dramatic increases in per-capita energy 
use. 
The Chinese government recognized some environmental 
problems and began addressing them as early as the 1950s, but into 
the 1970s it argued that, as a socialist state, it did not have 
environmental problems. However, by the 1980s, increasing damage 
to China's natural environment and adverse environmental impacts 
on economic development led to greater government concern. In 
1982 the Chinese constitution was rewritten, pledging to 'protect the 
environment and natural resources by controlling pollution and its 
societal impact, ensure the sensible use of natural resources, and 
safeguard rare animals and plants'. 37 The following year 
environmental preservation was declared one of China's b前ic
national policies and by the end of the decade China started its first 
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major campaign to combat poll凶ion. 38 During the 1980s the 
govemment also instituted new environmental protection laws in the 
areas of solid waste, noise, air and water pollution,39 and by the mid 
1990s the govemment was becoming more serious about 
environmental issues, with state leaders expressing their concem.40 
By the late 1990s the central govemment was allocating substantial 
- albeit grossly inadequate - funds to environmental and resource 
protection-41 
China has undertaken some policies and national development 
strategies, and created related domestic institutions, specifically 
related to climate change.42 Environmentally sustainability has been 
adopted as a key strategy guiding Chinese development. Following 
the 1992 Earth Summit, China completed its official 'Agenda 21' 
sustainable development plan, which included climate change as one 
of the priority areas. Sustainable development was a guideline for 
the preparation ofChina's Ninth (1 996-2000) and Tenth (2001-2005) 
Five-Y ear Plans for national economic and social development. 
China's system of laws and regulations on sustainable development 
has also been improved. The govemment has promulgated the 
Environment Protection Law (1989), the Law on the Prevention and 
Control of Atmospheric Pollution (1 987), the Forest Law (1989), the 
Energy Conservation Law (1997) and similar legal instruments for 
environmental and atmospheric protection. Furthermore, a series of 
administrative regulations and sector-level rules on the conservation 
of resources and the environment have been issued. 
Under the State Council, China established the 1998 National 
Coordination Committee for Climate Change, which is responsible 
for the coordination and formulation of policies and measures 
related to climate change. This committee, chaired by the State 
Development Planning Commission (SDPC), is composed of the 
Chinese Academy of Sciences and 13 government departments 
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(Ministry of F oreign Affairs [MOFA], Ministry of Development and 
Planning, Ministry of Science and Technology, State Economic and 
Trade Commission, China Meteorological Administration, Ministry 
of Finance, State Environmental Protection Administration, Ministry 
of Agriculture, Ministry of Communications, Ministry of Water 
Resources, Ministry of Construction, State Forestry Administration, 
and State Oceanic Administration), giving it an important 
coordinating function. 
China has also undertaken comprehensive climate change 
research, much of it with intemational assistance. lndeed, 
demonstrating the importance of the FCCC for China's development, 
since the Eighth Five-year plan (1991-1995), global climate change 
has been listed as a priority in plans for state scientific development. 
Numerous universities, scientific institutes and researchers have 
been involved in research relating to global warming. 
However, the environmental benefits of these laws and other 
actions of the central Chinese govemment have often been limited. 
lmplementation of environmentallaws is hindered by lack of money, 
corruption, the refusal of local authorities to ~ake the laws seriously 
and the inability or unwillingness of higher officials to force them to 
do so. Beijing often has limited control over the vast bureaucracy, 
particularly outside Beijing, and the institutional structure of China's 
environmental management system is extraordinarily complex. 
Underlying the inability to implement environmental protections is a 
strong nationwide fixation on economic growth. According to one 
observer, even 'the government often ignores some of its 
environmental policies and regulations and does what it thinks is 
necessary for economic advancement\43 Wealth creation in the short 
term almost always wins out over environmental protection.44 
Where China may have had some apparent success is in its 
energy efficiency. While its energy use is skyrocketing - and will 
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continue to do so short of a m句or economic depression - there is 
data suggesting that its energy use is growing at a slower rate than 
its economy. (However, this assertion is in dispute due to 
questionable govemment statistics and must be considered anecdotal 
pending more reliable data.45) Some developed country govemments 
- notably the United Stat的一 demand that China do more to limit its 
GHG emissions. But this evidence suggests th前 China is already 
more efficient than some of those critics - inc1uding the United 
States. Having said this, should these efficiencies prove to be real, 
they are not motivated by a desire to limit global warming. 46 
Furthermore, as Thomas Schelling argues that because of 
technological backwardness and poverty, China has limited capacity 
to fight climate change, and without economic incentives China will 
be hard pressed to wean itself 企om its dependence on inefficient 
coal use.47 
China's International Response to Global Warming 
How has China responded diplomatically to c1imate change? 
Broadly spealàng, China's environmental diplomacy has sought to 
further several goals: protect Chinese sovereignty, acquire foreign 
aid and technical assistance, promote China's economic 
development,48 and promote its role as a responsible great power and 
leader o.f the developing world. China has used its dual status as a 
developing country (with rights to and needs for development) and 
its growing role as a major contributor to global environmental 
problems (such as GHG emissions) to acquire substantial influence 
in intemational environmental negotiations. 49 In intemational 
environmental deliberations of all kinds, it has consistently sought 
'new and additional' funds from developed countries in retum for its 
support for, or acquiescence to, environmental agreements. These 
efforts have paid off; China is the largest recipient of environmental 
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aid from the W orld Bank and receives substantial amounts of 
environmental aid from other intemational funding agencies. Indeed, 
the vast majority of its environmental budget comes from abroad.50 
China is also receiving environmental technologies, such as those 
offered in the context of the FCCC's Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM), which funds climate change-related projects in developing 
countries.51 
China has been intimately involved in intemational 
deliberations on global warming and resulting climate change. Like 
other participants in the climate change negotiations, China wants to 
protect its interests and promote development while also joining 
international efforts to address this problem. However, it has 
opposed every effort to require GHG limits by developing countries 
- even those calling for voluntary commitments to restrict 扣ture
emissions increases. 52 Instead, China has joined with other 
developing countries in demanding that developed countries reduce 
their GHG emissions first and provide assistance to developing 
countries to help them cope with climate change and to implement 
sustainable development. It has usually resisted any links between 
financial and technical assistance from developed countries in the 
context of the climate change regime. Instead, it has demanded 
transfers of funds on non-commercial and preferential terms, and has 
rejected most of the market-based international mechanisms for 
emissions reductions advocated by developed countries and their 
industries. 53 China has made some contributions to the FCCC 
negotiations, notably when doing so would help codify requirements 
that developed countries help developing countries in the context of 
climate change. It proposed a resolution on technology transfer, 
which was adopted by the first conference of the parties (COP) held 
in Berlin in 1995. During COP2, China proposed that developed 
countries list in their national communications measures they were 
12 
undertaking to implement technology transfer to developing 
countries. This proposal was adopted. According to one observer, 
'only when outsiders (e.g. , the GEF [Global Environment Facility]) 
have paid the incremental costs has China been willing to implement 
global warming projects\54 Once it was established th剖 developing
countries would not be required to take on any obligatory 
commitments under the FCCC, China embraced the Kyoto Protocol 
and efforts to implement it. 
The Chinese themselves have identified three stages in China's 
official participation in the conferences of the parties to the FCCC.55 
During the first stage, from about 1990 to mid-1992, China sought to 
formulate a homegrown set of policies toward the climate change 
convention. Two policies came out of this process: (l) the principle 
of 'common but differentiated responsibilities', meaning that China 
would share responsibilities in information communication and 
scientific research while not incurring any economic burdens or 
requirements that it reduce its energy use, and (2) strengthening of 
China's scientific and technological research in the climate change 
field. In this early phase of the FCCC negotiations, China took a 
relatively low-profile position compared to many other countries.56 
The second stage of China's participation in the climate change 
negotiations lasted 企om mid-1992 to late-1997. At the Rio Earth 
Summit in June 1992, then Premier Li Peng noted th~t GHG 
emissions were threatening the national security of many countries 
and regions, and put his signature to the FCCC. From that date, the 
FCCC took on a prominent role in China's diplomacy, and China 
pledged to uphold the convention. 57 The greatest subsequent 
challenges for China in the conferences of the parties to the FCCC 
were the Kyoto Protocol and the so-called f1exible mechanisms for 
its implementation, such as the CDM, joint implementation (咒，
whereby polluters could offset their emissions with projects in other 
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countries) and intemational emissions trading (IET).58 China lagged 
far behind the developed countries in the fields of climate science 
and economics, and Chinese officials had not yet arrived at a 
consensus on the flexible mechanisms. 59 Some of these officials 
called the mechanisms tools of 'environmental imperialism'. 60 
Elizabeth Economy argues that during this stage of China's climate 
change diplomacy, 
China remained committed to only general framework 
convention commitments for the signatories, especially with 
regard to curtailing emissions of the principal greenhouse gas. 
China held th前 any action that did not concurrently advance 
economic growth would have to be funded by the intemational 
community. Moreover, Chinese officials rallied the developing 
states behind their position in an a位empt - in large part 
successful - to establish a united front for bargaining with the 
advanced industrialized countries.61 
The third stage of China's climate change diplomacy ranged 
from late-1997 - when the parties to the FCCC agreed to the Kyoto 
protocol - to the present. During this period, Chinese diplomacy has 
focused on two issues: (l) how to accept the developed countries' 
intemational environmental trading mechanisms and (2) preventing 
developing countries from being forced to assume concrete 
responsibilities for GHG emissions reductions. China's strategy was 
- and remains - to avoid requirements that developing countries 
reduce their GHG emissions. Chen Yaobang, head of China's 
diplomatic delegations to climate related conferences, said in at the 
Kyoto COP3 in 1997 that China adamantly opposed any 
commitment to reduce its GHG emissions before it becomes a 
'middle-income' country. He also rejected emissions-trading and 
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joint-implementation schemes, insisting that these approaches were 
unacceptable because they would allow developed countries to shirk 
their responsibilities for emissions reductions at home while 
'disregarding the living environment of people in other countries,.62 
Subsequently, at COP5 in 1999, the Chinese delegation, headed by 
Liu Jiang, reiterated the basic positions that China had expounded at 
COP3. On the issue of Chinese commitment to limiting greenhouse 
gas emissions, Liu said, 'it is impossible for the Chinese govemment 
to undertake any obligation of GHG emissions reduction before 
China attains the level of a medium-developed country\63 He said 
that China would instead 'continue striving to abate the growth of 
GHG emissions in line with her own sustainable development 
strategy, and will continue actively promoting and participating in 
international cooperation\64 
In contrast to the previous stage of its diplomacy, China did not 
raise objections to the flexibility mechanisms. This reflected a very 
slow transformation in its attitude toward, and perception and 
knowledge of, the flexible mechanisms 企om outright opposition to 
gradual if muted acceptance. This rather slow acceptance was a 
consequence of China having very few experts able to study these 
mechanisms, limiting its understanding of them. According to one 
Chinese assessment of the situation, 'the flexible mechanisms are 
very complicated, and we know little about them. 乳Te should take 
the 'no voice' [Bu Biao Tai] policy in this issue\的 Some officials 
have argued that China opposes CDM projects in China to avoid 
intemational monitoring of its energy industry.66 After 2000, with 
additional development of Chinese lmowledge regarding the flexible 
mechanisms, China began to show greater interests in some small-
scale (i.e. , not country-wide) CDM projects using assistance from 
the Asian Development Bank and other institutions. In ongoing 
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c1 imate change negotiations, China continues to oppose other 
mechanisms, such as n and IET. 
China has sometimes used a form of passive resistance during 
c1imate change negotiations, articulating a policy of 'no response' to 
some international events (e.g;, the Bush administration's rejection 
of the Kyoto Protocol). 1n 2000, China put forward a 'no regrets' 
policy for the FCCC negotiations (meaning that it will share some 
concrete responsibilities to reduce the GHG emissions provided they 
do 110t adversely affect its economic development), began to accept 
the international environmental trading mechanism, and 
implemented CDM-related projects in Gansu and Shanxi Province, 
using financial assistance from the Asian Development Bank. With 
assistance from the United States, China also finished its national 
report on c1imate change, one of the few commitments required of 
developing countries by the FCCC.67 
However, despite pressure from the United States, Europe and 
some other countries to reduce its GHG emissions, China has to date 
refused to take on concrete commitments to do so. China expects the 
developed, wealthy count~ies of the world to substantially reduce 
their emissions before it and other developing countries are expected 
to do so, in accordance with the principle of common but 
differentiated responsibility adopted at the 1995 Berlin conference of 
the parties. 
China's Response to Global Warming: Some Explanations 
Elizabeth Economy argues that several principles have guided 
Chinese environmental foreign policy in this area: sovereignty, the 
primacy of economic development, and the historic responsibility of 
the developed countries. 68 We can add the important long-term 
commitment of China to be a leader of developing countries on the 
world stage, including within the context of intemational 
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environmental cooperation. Zhang Zhihong argues that the official 
Chinese position on climate change has revolved around four themes: 
(1) China is a victim of global climate change; (2) developed 
countries are the principal emitters of GHG emissions and 
therefore should bear the primary responsibility in addressing 
the climate change problem; (3) in light of their current and 
historical responsibilities and much greater capabilities to act, 
developed countries should undertake transfers of advanced, 
environmentally friendly technologies and provide financial 
assistance to developing countries in combating climate change 
while meeting the needs of sustainable development; and (4) 
China's overriding priority is poverty eradication and economic 
development.的
Reiterating and expanding on themes suggested by Economy 
and Zhang, we can emphasize several forces that have shaped much 
of China's climate change diplomacy. First, China has an 
overwhelming desire to protect its sovereignty, including avoiding 
the 'humiliation' of being forced to comply with standards set by 
outsiders. In 1992, Chinese Premier Li Peng explained China's view 
succinctly: 'Intemational cooperation should be strengthened on the 
basis of respecting national sovereignty'.70 There are four aspects to 
the Chinese notion of 'environmental sovereignty' 71: (1) China 
should enjoy full use of its own natural resources according to the 
United Nations' 1974 Charter of Economic Rights and 
Responsibilities. (2) China should be able to develop and utilize its 
natural resource according to its own priorities and according to the 
1972 declaration of United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment. (3) China will establish its environmental policies and 
laws according to the principle of non-intervention. (4) Other 
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countries and international institutions should respect China's 
sovereignty with regard to global commons issues, namely climate 
change. In short, much like other countries, while China has joined 
in intemational collective action to deal with climate change, it 
insists on the right to enjoy, develop, utilize and protect its own 
natural resources by itself. 
Second, China's climate change policies, both domestic and 
international, are motivated by priorities of economic stability and 
growth. Global warming has been intimately linked with efforts to 
modernize the economy, as well as the energy strategy employed to 
fuel that modemization. China, like other countries, fears that 
policies for reducing GHG emissions will adversely affect economic 
growth. According to some Chinese experts, the economic cost of 
significantly reducing China's GHG emissions through alterations in 
the energy industry, introducing clean energy technologies and the 
like could cost the equivalent ofhundreds ofbillions ofUS dollars.72 
For example, coal-based energy represents 60-70 percent of China's 
energy 的ucture. If China were to change to an oil-based or natural 
gas-based energy structure, billions of dollars would be needed. 73 
China also tries to seek intemational technical assistance and loans 
in order to garner economic benefits, such as to improve energy 
efficiency without much pomestic cost. But this is done in 
accordance with the no regrets principle of acting in ways that 
benefit China regardless of the threat of global warming. Thus China 
also actively seeks investment from the international community for 
projects that assist in slowing climate change. But economic growth 
remains China's top priority. 
Third, following the notion of COffiffion but differentiated 
responsibility, China believes very strongly that it ought not be 
forced to take on burdens associated with climate change while it 
remains relatively poor and - just as importantly - until the 
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developed countries take concrete action of their own. Chinese 
officials, like those in many other developing countries (and some 
developed ones) believe that the industrialized, wealthy countries of 
the world bear responsibility for global warming because of their 
historic emissions of greenhouse gases. 74 Furthermore, their per 
capita emissions remain far above those of China, meaning that their 
responsibility continues. Any effort to persuade China to reduce its 
GHG emissions or otherwise take on concrete burdens to limit 
global warming run up against this very strongly held sentiment. 
Fourth, following the previous point, it is important to realize that 
China takes its role as a leader and representative of the developing 
world very seriously, including in the context of the climate change 
negotiations. During the climate change deliberations, it has worked 
within a negotiating block referred to officially as the 'Group of 77 
plus China'. China tries to exert its inf1uence within this block，的 it
does in the broader negotiations. In this context, China has adopted 
terms like 'environmental colonialism' and 'sovereignty intervention' 
to help foster an alliance among developing countries within the 
FCCC and related intemational negotiations. 75 To be sure, China 
will act to promote its own interests first and foremost, even if they 
contradict this leadership role. But it takes this position seriously and 
will usually seek to promote policies that reaffirm it. 
These and of course other forces operate in the context of China's 
policymaking institutions. China's sometimes-changing positions in 
the climate change negotiations show that internal politics, a 
complex foreign policy-making apparatus, and intemational affairs 
can combine to shape its environmental diplomacy. Just as 
government agencies collaborate to formulate China's domestic 
responses to climate change, they have worked together - albeit not 
always for common policy goals 一 to devise the country's 
international response to the problem. According to Abram Chayes 
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and Charlotle Kim, internal politics and bureaucratic maneuvering 
among a score of govemment agencies affected China's diplomacy.76 
The most important actors in China's environmental diplomacy have 
usual1y been the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), the State 
Environmental Protection Agency (SEP A), the State Development 
Planning Commission, and the State Science and Technology 
Commission (SSTC). MOFA has generally viewed environmental 
issues from the perspective of faimess , seeing industrialized 
countries as responsible for solving problems and helping China and 
other developing countries to implement sustainable development. 
Other agencies view environmental problems in terms of their harm 
to the Chinese people and China's developmental prospects.77 The 
increasing salience of environmental issues in intemational relations 
has strengthened environmentally proactive bureaucrats and 
technocrats,78 as well as government-approved think tanks, such as 
the Council for International Cooperation on Environment and 
Development. 
Among the agencies involved in China's foreign policy on 
climate change, a few served as key 'window agents' (zhu guan 
danwei or chuang kou danwei). The agency most responsible for 
coordinating China's climate change negotiations is the Ministry of 
F oreign Affairs, which coordinates different preferences or interests 
among different bureaucracies, while the Ministry of Finance 
distributes the information on international climate change funds to 
different bureaucracies and collects their proposals. 79 In early 
climate change negotiations, MOF A and the SDPC eventual1y took 
control of policy, although not without other agencies getting 
involved 前 times， notably SSTC, SEPA, and the China 
Meteorological Administration, which inf1uenced scientific 
understanding on the issue. Thus, China's position has been 
'susceptible to domination . by foreign policy and state planning 
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officials,.80 However, it became clear to senior policymakers and the 
top leaders that joining the Kyoto Protocol could be in China's 
economic, environmental and diplomatic interests. The Clean 
Development Mechanism would provide new funds to aid economic 
development, domestic pollution would be mitigated by the resulting 
new technologies, and announcing accession to the Kyoto Protocol 
(which was done at the 2002 World Summit 00 Sustainable 
Development) would show the world that China was leading 
developing countries in addressing an important global issue. 
Conclusion: A Brief Assessment of China's Response to Global 
Warming 
What are the implications of China's response to global warming and 
climate change? Clearly it has done something, but equally clear is 
that it is not doing anywhere near what is required to adequately 
address this problem. China is of course not unique in this. Even the 
world's wealthiest coun甘y， the United States, has failed utterly in 
acting to address climate change issues. Like most countries, each 
has sought to make increrriental changes domestically while 
avoiding international obligations to substantially limit GHG 
emissions. China's emissions of GHGs are rising fas t. lt is 
increasingly a massive part of the problem, making mitigation of 
climate change much less.likely. To be sure, the global economy and 
the countries of Asia Pacific can benefit from China's growth, but 
most of the region will also suffer from the environmental 
consequences of China's economic expansion. lndeed, some island 
states in Asia Pacific may even disappear as seas rise. 
Given the historical responsibility of the developed countries 
for the bulk of the historical pollution causing global warming, 
China should continue to ally with Asian Pacific and other countries 
in an effort to push the rich countries to reduce their emissions of 
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GHGs and to provide financial and technical assistance to help 
vulnerable countries adapt to climate change. At the FCCC's 
conference of the parties in New Delhi in late 2002, China joined 
with India in reiterating its outright rejection of GHG emissions cuts 
for developing countries, instead arguing that increased emissions 
would be required to lift their people out of poverty. China revealed 
its intentions at that conference. In a 'deal with the devil' (the 
government and industries of the United States) it dec1ared that 
mitigating climate change - substantially reducing emissions of 
GHGs and thus limiting global warming - would be impossible for 
decades to come. There was a new alliance between the United 
States, China and many developing countries, such as India and 
members of OPEC. China agreed with the United States that 
adaptation measures - transfers of funds and technology from 
developed to developing countries to help them cope with climate 
change - were the preferred ways to address the problem. As such, 
China joined the United States in pushing the di伍cult issue of 
cutting emissions into the future, focusing instead on gamering as 
many financial and other resources as possible 台om the world's rich. 
By shifting the focus of the climate talks to adaptation, and away 
from mitigation, both the rich and poor countries could avoid doing 
what they dread the most: demanding that entrenched economic 
interests reduce their GHG emissions.81 
This strategy will obviously do nothing to limit global 
warming and climate change. But neither is it effective for China to 
continue to blame the rich countries for the problem - no matter how 
justified that blame and whatever the ethical justifications for doing 
so. One fact is perhaps painful to acknowledge: While the rich 
countries have produced the bulk of greenhouse pollutants so far, 
they did not know they were causing global warming until about the 
1980s. In contrast, at the outset of its own massive economic 
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expansion, China knows that it is causing harm to the global 
atmosphere. It therefore has a responsibility to act, at least within its 
means. Again, this does not minimize the much greater 
responsibility of the world's rich countries, but if China can afford to 
acquire new advanced weapons systems and send men into space, it 
can surely afford to divert much more money and lmow-how to 
reducing its own impact on the global environment. For this reason, 
China may be judged quite harshly by future generations and wi l1 be 
under great moral scrutiny. Indeed, it may even bear some legal 
responsibility for 臼ture climate change that it could arguably have 
prevented. 
China could - and we argue should - show true leadership on 
climate change, something that has been lacking among the 
developed countries. Alas, bearing in mind what we have said, it 
seems unlikely that China would undertake such a pro-environment 
leadership role in the Asian Pacific region or among developing 
countries more broadly. There are clearly many Chinese scientists 
and concerned officials that would like China to do much more. But 
there are also vested economic interests, exacerbated by China's 
infatuation with rapid economic growth and wea1th creation, which 
overwhelm the environmentalists. There is a burgeoning car culture 
- the same mistake made in the West - with a rapacious appetite for 
petroleum. More broadly, there is an effort to emulate the West's 
development and Western people's lifestyles, but with this comes an 
emulation of their terrible history of pollution.82 This is unfortunate, 
because a concerted transition to an economy that produces fewer 
GHGs is possible, especially with financial and technical aid from 
the developed world. However, such aid would have to come with 
clear restrictions that the Chinese government has shown an 
unwillingness to accept. The upshot is that in the future there will be 
some improvements that limit the increases in China's GHG 
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emissions compared to what they might be otherwise. F or the most 
part, however, at least in the near term, it will be business as usual. 
Notes 
1 Comments are welcome on this dra丘 working paper. Please send 
email topharris@ln.edu.hk. The authors wish to thank Brian 
Bridges for his helpful comments on the first draft. 
2 For a recent summary of China's greenhouse pollution, see Keith 
Bradsher, 'Air Pollution Rises with China's Growth', International 
Herald Tribune (23 October 2003), p. 1. Importantly, China's per 
capita emissions remain well below those of the developed 
countries, as we point out below. 
3 Some of these ideas were discussed in Paul G. Harris, 'The 
Politics and Foreign Policy of Global Warming in East Asia', in 
Paul G. Harris (ed), Global Warming and East Asia: The 
Domestic and International Politics of Climate Change (London: 
Routledge, 2003), pp. 3-18; Paul G. Harris, 'Climate Change 
Priorities for East Asia: Socio-economic Impacts and International 
Justice', in Harris, Global Warming and East As旬， pp. 19-39; and 
Paul G. Harris, 'Global Warming in Asia-Pacific: Environmental 
Change vs. International Justice', Asia-Pacific Review 9, 2 (2002), 
pp. 130-149. 
4 See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Climate 
Change 2001 (3 vols.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2001). 
5 .See Harris, Global Warming and East Asia. 
6 Some of these ideas and discussion of other Asian Pacific 
countries can be found in Paul G. Harris, 'Environmental Politics 
and Foreign Policy in East Asia: A Survey of China and Japan' , in 
Paul G. Harris (ed), Confronting Environmental Change in East 
24 
Asia (London: EarthscanlUnited Nations University Press , 
forthcoming). On environmental security, see Lorraine Ellio址，
'Environmental Security in East Asia: Defining a Common 
Agenda' , in Paul G. Harris (ed), International Environmental 
Cooperation (Boulder: University Press of Colorado, 2002), pp. 
31-52. 
7 See Vaclav Smil, China's Environmental Crisis (Armonk, New 
York: M.E. Sharpe, 1993); Japan Environmental Council, 
Shunichi Teranishi, and Takehisa Awaji (eds), The Stαte of the 
Environment in Asia 1999/2000 (Tokyo: Springer-Verlag, 2000), 
pp. 98-100; The World Bank, The World Bank and climate 
change: East Asiα(Washington， DC: World Bank Group, 1997), 
< http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/climchng/eapclim.htm>. 
Accessed on 2 April 2003. 
8 See the UNFCCC's Document, 'GHG Emissions and Reduction 
Targets' , <http://unfccc .intltextlresource/ country / china.html>. 
Accessed on 15 October 2003. China's Office of National 
Coordination Committee for Climate Change (ed), 'China's GHG 
emission in the World' , <http://www.ccchina.gov.cn>. Accessed 
on 15 October 2003. 
9 China Meteorological Administration (ed), The Science, lnjluence 
and Countermeasures of Climate Change (Beijing: China 
Meteorological Administration, 2003) , pp. 20-22. 
10 John Houghton (ed), Climate Change 1995: The Science of 
Climate Change (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); 
Daniel L. Albritton (ed), Summaη for policymakers: A report of 
Working Group 1 of the lPCC (Bonn: Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change, 2001), < h社p://www.ipcc.chlpub/sa(E).pdf> .
Accessed on 12 December 2002. 
II African Development Bank (AFDB) (ed), POνerty and Climate 
Change: Reducing the Vulnerability of the Poor, Consultation 
25 
Draft (Washington, DC: World Bank, October, 2002), <h杜拉//
lnweb 18. worldbank.org/ES SD/ essdext.nsf/ 46DocB y U nid/96 3 92A 
075E965F5585256C4D00682C93?Opendocument>. Accessed on 
15 September 2003. 
12 Cf. Paul G. Harris, 'Climate Change Priorities for East Asia: 
Socio-economic Impacts and Intemational Justice', in Harris, 
Global Warming and East As悶， pp. 19-39. Effects may not 
always be adverse, but even if they are not they will likely 
increase unpredictability and require adaptation. 
13 IPCC Working Group II, Summary for Policymakers, Climate 
Change 2001: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability (Geneva: 
IPCC Working Group II, 19 February draft).The report does not 
distinguish Asia Pacific. Findings are for Asia generally except 
where specified; see also IPCC 1997. 
14 IPCC Working Group II, Summary for Policymakers, Climαte 
Change 2001: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerabili紗， p.16.
15 Yun Li and Shuzo Nishioka, 'Global Warming Impacts on China' , 
in Center for Energy Environment and Climate Change Energy 
Research Institute (ed), Proceeding" of Climate Change Policy 
Assessment 2002 (Beijing: China Energy Research Institute, 
Center for Energy, Environment and Climate Change, Jan. 2002), 
p.348. 
16 Chris P. Nielsen and MicÌlael B. McElroy, 'Introduction and 
overview', in Michael B. McElroy, Chris P. Nielsen and Peter 
Lydon (eds), Energizing China: Reconciling Environmental 
Protection and Economic Growth (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1998), pp. 24-25. 
17 World Bank, The World Bank and Climate Change: East Asia. 
18 Research Team of China Climate Change Country Study (ed), 
China Climate chαnge country study (Beijing: Tsinghua 
University Press, 1999), pp. 107-201. 
26 
19 Todd M. Jo趾lÎson， Junlfenig Li, Zhongxiao Jiatng, and Robert P 
Tavlor (eds), World Bank R 只ψpor吋吽t- Cω'hina Issues α nd Options in 
Greenhouse Gαωs Emissions Cont什r戶旬叫'0叫1， 羽f心DP 330 1996, 
<httψp:以/υ/八www.wd也S
SPI江IBI几1996/06/01/000009265 3961219093947切lRender昀edιIPDF/m
u凶11山lti山-'pag伊e.p抖df>. Accessed on 9 October 2003. 
20 Thomas C. Schelling, 'What Makes Greenhouse Sense?', Foreign 
Affai沌， 81 ， 3 (2002), p. 2. 
21 Interview with Xu Huiyou, China Agriculture Science and 
Technology Institute, 12 March 2003. 
22 Nielson and McElroy, 'Introduction and overview', p. 24'-
23 Interview with Chen Enjun, China Forest Administration, 1 April 
2003. 
24 Research Team of China Climate Change Country Study, China 
Climate Change Countη Stz吟" p.132. 
25 Inter-Government Party on Climate Change (IPCC), The Regional 
Impacts of Climate Change 1997, 
<http://www.grida.no/climate/ipcc/regiona1l260.htm>. Accessed 
on 19 Apri12001. 
26 IPCC, The Regional Impacts of Climate Change; Nielson and 
McElroy, 'Introduction and Overview', p. 24; Ying Aiwen, 'Impact 
òf Global Climate Change on China's Water Resources', 
Environme叫α1 Monitoring and Assessme爪 61 ， 1 (2000), pp.187-
91. 
27 Research Team of China Climate Change Country Study, China 
Climate Change Country Study, pp. 107-201. 
28 China Meteorological Administration, The Science, Injluence and 
Countermeasures ofClimate Change , p. 20. 
29 Research Team of China Climate Change Country Study, China 
Climate Change Country Study, pp. 185-87. 
27 
30 Wen Kegang, 'The Impacts of Climate Change and Our Adoption 
Policies', in Liu Jiang (ed), China甘 Sustainable Development 
Strategy Stu砂 (Beijing: Chinese Agriculture Publishing House, 
2001), pp. 462-64. 
31 China's Office of National Coordination Committee for Climate 
Change (ed), China and Global Warming (Beijing: China Office 
of National Coordination Committee for Climate Change, State 
Development Planning Commission, July 2001), p. 6. 
32 China's Office of National Coordination Committee for Climate 
Change, China and Global Warming, p. 6. 
33 Thè W orld Bank, 'China: Issues and Options in Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions Control', Energy Demand in China, Overview Report, 
Sub-report, NO.2 (Washington DC: World Bank, 1995), 
<h吐p://www.who.intlenvironmental_informationlInformation_res
ources/worddocs/Greenhousegas>. Accessed on 15 Apri12003. 
34 China State Economic & Trade Commission (SETC), China 
Energy Annual Review (Beijing: State Economic & Trade 
Commission, Department of Resources Conservation & 
Comprehensive Utilization, 1996), 
<http://www.who .intlenvironmental_informationlInformation_res 
ources/ worddocs/Greenhousegas/>. Accessed on 11 October 
2003. 
35 Brown Brown, Lester R., Christopher Flavin, Hilary French, Janet 
Abramovitz, Chris Bright, Gary Gardner, Anne McGinn, Michael 
Renner, David Roodman, and Linda Starke(eds), State 01 the 
World, A World Watch Institute Report on Progress Toward a 
Sustainable Society (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 
1997), pp. 113-26. 
36 Wang Xiaodong and Kirk R. Smith, 'Near-term Health Benefits of 
Greenhouse Gas Reductions: -a Proposed Assessment Method and 
Application in Two Energy Sectors of China', 
28 
<http://www.who.intlenvironmental_information/lnformation_res 
ources/worddocs/Greenhousegas/phe99-1-2.doc>. Accessed on 12 
October 2003. 
37 Elisa Tseng, 'The Environment and the People's Republic of 
China', in Dennis L. Soden and Brent S. Steel (eds), Handbook of 
Global Environmental Policy and Administration (Basel: Marcel 
Dekker, 1999), p. 383. 
38 Tseng, 'The Environment and the People's Republic of China', p. 
383. 
39 United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) , Global 
Environment Outlook (London: Earthscan, 1999), pp. 241-42. 
40 Tseng, 'The Environment and the People's Republic of China " p. 
383. 
41 UNEP, Global Enνironment Outlook, p. 246. 
42 China's Office of National Coordination Committee for Climate 
Change, China and Global Warming, pp. 9-13. 
的 Tseng， 'The Environment and the People's Republic of China', p. 
390. 
4
0
4 See Paul G. Harris, 'Tradition, Consumption, and Environmental 
Governance in China' , Environme叫al Values , 13 , 2 (forthcoming 
May 2004). 
的 James Dorian, 'China's Energizing Economy', For門附um
Re臼seαrch αnd Public Policy, 16,2 (2001), p. 101; David Street, 
Kejuan Jiang, Xiulian Hu, and Jonathan Sinton (eds), ' Recent 
Reduction in China's Green House Gases Emissions', Science, 294, 
5548 (2001), p.1835; Richard F Garbaccio, Mun S Ho and Dale 
W Jorgenson, 'Why has the Energy-Output Ratio Fallen in 
China?' , The Energy Journal, 20, 3 (1 999), p. 63; Sara Beam, 
'Booming Economy, Booming Emissions', Environment, 45 ,10 
(2003), p.4. 
29 
46 Ding Yihui said, 'China takes few actions which only aim to 
reduce the GHG emissions except some scientific research. 
Moreover, China makes no systematic and comprehensive 
research on the in f1uences (i.e., economic cost, natural disaster) of 
climate change on China till now.' Interview with Ding Yihui, 
former President of the IPCC, China Meteorological 
Administration, 3 March 2003. 
47 Schelling, 'What Makes Greenhouse Sense?', p. 2; See Paul G. 
Harris and Chihiro Udagawa, 'Defusing the Bombshell: Agenda 
21 and Economic Development in China', Review of International 
Political Economy 11 , 3 (forthcoming July 2004). 
48 Elizabeth, Economy, 'China's Environmental Diplomacy', in 
Samuel S. Kim (ed), China and the World: Chinese Foreign 
Policy Faced the New Millennium (Boulder: Westview Press, 
1998), p. 264. 
49 Economy, 'China's Environmental Diplomacy', p. 265. 
50 Economy, 'China's Environmental Diplomacy', p. 278. 
51 The Japan Environmental Council, Shunichi Teranishi, and 
Takehisa Awaji, The State ofthe Environment in Asia 1999/2000, 
p.106. 
52 Paul G. Harris, 'Climate Change and Foreign Policy: An 
Introduction', in Paul G. Harris (ed), Climate Change ' and 
American Foreign Policy (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), p. 
15. 
53 Bayer J Linnerooth, 'Climate Change and Multiple Views of 
Fairness', in Ference L. Toth (ed), Fair Weather? Equity 
Concerns in Climate Change (London: Earthscan, 1999), p. 59. 
54 David Victor, 'The Regulation of Greenhouse Gases: Does 
Fairness Matter?' , in Toth, Fair Weather? Equity Concerns in 
Climate Change, p. 203. 
30 
55 Interviews with Zhou Hailing, Huang Ji峙， Duan Liping, China 
Ministry of Science and Technology, 15-22 April 2003; Gao 
Guang Sheng and Li Liyan, China Committee of Planning and 
Reform, 1-3 March April 2003. 
56 Lester Ross, 'China and Environmental Protection', in Elizabeth 
Economy and Michel Okesenberg (eds), China Joins the World. 
Progress and Prospects (New York: Council on Foreign 
Relations Press, 1997), p. 304. 
57 See China State Council (ed), China's Agenda 21- Wh ite Paper on 
China's Population, Enνironme肘， and Development in the 21st 
Century (Beij ing: Environmental Science Press, 1994), p .160. 
58 Richard Cooper, 'Toward a Real Global Warming Treaty', 
Foreign Affai悶， 77, 2 (1 998), pp. 66-80. 
的 See China Ministry of Science & Technology (ed), the 
Background Materials for Climate Change, 1998, pp. 3-10, (on 
file with authors). 
60 Liu Jiang, ' Proposal on the Working Plan for China National 
Coordination Committee for Climate', a speech presented in the 
second conference of China National Coordination Committee for 
Climate, Beijing, China (29-30, June 1999) (on file with authors). 
61 Elizabeth Economy, 'Chinese Policy-making and Global Climate 
Change', in Miranda A. Schreurs and Elizabeth Economy (eds), 
The internationalization of Environmental Protection (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 20. 
62 'Heads of Chinese Delegation Expounds Stance on Global Climate 
Change at COP3' , People's Daily (December 9, 1997), < 
http://www.ccchina.gov.cn/index l.htm >. Accessed on 12 April, 
2003. 
63 Liu Jiang, 'Presentation in the Eighth Conference ofParties COP8 , 
lndia', New Delhi, India (23 October to 1 November 2002), 
31 
<http://www.ccchina.gov.cnlindexl.htm>. Accessed on 12 April 
2003. 
64 Liu Jiang, 'Presentation in the Eighth Conference ofParties COP8 , 
lndia' . 
65 lnterviews with Zhao Jun and Zhang Maoming, China Ministry of 
F oreign Affairs, 3-6 March 2003; Li R凶， China Ministry of 
Finance, 23 March 2003. 
66 lnterviews with Huang Jing and Zhou Hailin, China Ministry of 
Science and Technology, 15st_22 th, April, 2003. 
67 The project of China Climate Change Country Study by Research 
Team of China Climate Change Country Study was funded by the 
U. S. Govemment. 
68 Elizabeth Economy, 'The impact of Intemational Regimes on 
Chinese Foreign Policy-Making: Broadening Perspectives and 
Politics. . . but only to a Point', in David M. Lampton (ed), The 
making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era 01 
Reform (Califomia: Stanford University Press, 2001), pp. 230-53. 
69 Zhang Zhihong, 'The Forces behind China's Climate Change 
Policy: lnterests, Sovereignty, and Prestige', in Harris, Global 
Warming and Eαst Asia, pp. 66-85. 
70 Administration Center for Chinese Agenda 21 , the Documents of 
the UN' Co瞬間ce on Environment and Developrnent in Rio de 
Janeiro (Beijing: Environmental Science, 1992), pp.l -10. 
71 Administration Center for Chinese Agenda 21 , the Documents of 
the UN Conference on Environment and Developme肘， pp. 1-10. 
72 Interview with Wang Yongqing, head of the Nuclear Energy 
Institute, Tsinghua University, 12 December 2002; interview with 
Ding Yihui, former president ofIPCC. 
73 Interviews with Wang Y ongqing and Ding Yihui. 
74 See Paul G. Harris, lnternational Equity and Global 
Environmental Politics (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001). 
32 
75 Liu Jiang, 'Proposal on the Working Plan for China National 
Coordination Committee for Climate'. 
76 Abram Chayes and Charlotte Kim, 'China and the United Nations 
Framework Convention on C1imate Change', in Michael B. 
McElroy, Chris P. Nielsen , and Peter Lydon, Energizing China, p. 
528. 
77 Economy, 'China's Environmental Diplomacy', pp. 270-7 1. 
78 Economy, 'China's Environmental Diplomacy', pp. 265. 
79 Interview with Li Rui. 
80 Chayes and Kim, 'China and the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change', p. 529. 
81 See Paul G. Harris, 'A Political Setback in the War on Global 
Warming', South China Morning Post (21 November 2002), p. 18. 
82 See Harris, 'Tradition, Consumption, and Environmental 
Governance in China'. 
33 
Centre for Asian Pacific Studies 
De口artment of Economics 
Dr. CHEUNG, Kui-yin (張鉅賢)
Dr. FAN, Chengze Simon σE承澤)
Professor HO, Lok-sang (何灣生)
Dr. LIN, Ping (林平)
Dr. MA, Yue (馬躍)
Dr. RAN, Jimrny (冉齊鳴)
Dr. VOON, Thomas (溫演錦)
Dr. WEI, Xiangdong (魏向東)
Historv Pro叮叮nme
Dr. LAU, Chi-pang (劉智鵬)
Centre Fellows 
Dep叮恤lent ofPolitics and Sociologv 
Dr. BAEHR, Peter 
Professor BRlDGES, Brian 
Dr. CHAN, Che-po (陳宮博)
Dr. HARRIS , Paul 
Dr. LEE, Keng-mun William (李經文)
Professor LEUNG, Kit-fun Beatrice (梁潔芬)
Dr. REN, Yue (任越)
Dr. WONG, Yiu-chung (王耀宗)
Honoraη， Fellows 
Dr. CHEUNG, Hoi-cheung (張海祥)
Dr. LU, Fei仙n(陸，排去)
Dr. NG, Chi-wing Raymond (吳志榮)
Centre for Public Policy Studies 
Centre Fellows 
Deoartment of Economics 
Dr. FAN, Cheng-ze Simon (范承澤)
Dr. LEI, Kai-cheong (李繼祥)
Dr. L肘， Ping (林平)
Dr. MA, Yue (馬躍)
Dr. VOON, J阻-piaw Thomas (溫演鏢)
Dr. WEI, Xiangdong (魏向東)
Deu缸個lent of Politics and Sociolo!!y 
Dr. HARRIS, Paul 
Dr. LEE, Keng-mun Wi1liam (李經文)
Dr. SIU, Oi-ling (蕭愛鈴)
No. Z且k Author 
92 (4/99) CPPS Implementing Efficient Allocations in a Model Professor Edward J. Green and 
of Financial Intermediation Dr. PingLin 
93 (5/99) CPPS R & D Incentives in Vertically Related Dr. Samiran Banerjee and 
Industries Dr. Ping Lin 
94 (6/99) CAPS Testing for a Nonlinear Relationship among Dr. Yue Ma and 
Fundamentals and Exchange Rates in the ERM Dr. Angelos Kanas 
95 (7/99) CPPS Health Care Delivery and Financing: in Search Professor Lok-sang Ho 
of an ldeal Model - Reflections on the Harvard 
Report 
96 (8/99) CPPS A Structural Equation Model of Environmental Dr. Oi-ling Siu and 
Attitude and Behaviour: The Hong Kong Dr. Kui-yin Cheung 
Experience 
97 (9月9)CAPS Hong Kong's Inflation under the U .S. Dollar Dr. Hiroyuki lmai 
Peg: The Balassa-Samuelson Effect or 也e
Dutch Disease? 
98 (1 /00) CAPS Structural Transformation and Economic Dr. Hiroyuki Imai 
Growth in Hong Kong: Another Look at 
Young' s “A Tale of Two Cities" 
99 (2/00) CAPS Corporatism and Civil Society in the People's Dr. W ong Yiu-chung 阻d
Republic of China: Empirical Evidence and Dr. Chan Che-po 
Theoretical Irnplications 
100 (3 /00) CAPS Globalization and Sino-American Economic Professor C. Fred Bergsten 
Relations 
101 (4/00) CPPS Government Expenditures and Equilibrium Real Professor Ronald J. Balvers and 
Exchange Rates Dr. Jeffrey H. Bergstrand 
102 (5/00) CPPS A Case Study ofEconomic Ecology: The Hong Professor Lok-sang Ho 
Kong Economy' s Plunge into a Deep Recession 
in 1998 
103 (6/00) CPPS lncentives and Corruption in Chinese Economic Dr. Chengze Simon Fan and 
Reform Professor Herschel 1. Grossman 
104 (7/00) CPPS Safety Climate and Employee Health Among Dr. Oi-ling Siu, Dr. Ian Donald, 
Blue CoIlar Workers in Hong Kong and China: Professor David R. Phillips and 
Age and Gender Differences Mr. BiIly Kwok-hung She 
105 (8/00) CPPS The Political Economy ofHong Kong SAR' s Professor Lok-sang Ho 
Fiscal Policy 
No. 主盟k Author 
106 (9/00) CPPS A Two-wave Trend Study of Organizational Dr. Oi-ling Siu 
Climate and Psychological Distress among 
General and Psychiatric Nurses in Hong Kong 
107 (1 /01) CPPS Realistic Exchange Rates: A Post-Asian Professor Lok-sang Ho 
Financial Crisis Perspective 
108 (2/01) CPPS Health Care Financing and Delivery in Hong Professor Lok-sang Ho 
Kong: What Should Be Done 
109 (3/01) CPPS The World Currency Unit: Can it Work? Professor Lok-sang Ho 
110 (4/01) CPPS Strategic Spin-Offs Dr. Ping Lin 
111 (5/01) CPPS Downstrearn R&D, Raising Rivals ' Costs, and Dr. Samiran Banerjee and 
lnput Price Contract Dr. Ping Lin 
112 (6/01) CPPS Ecology and Foreign Policy: Theoretical Dr. Jolm Barkdull and 
Lessons from the Literature Dr. Paul G. Harris 
113 (7/01) CPPS Evolving Norrns ofNorth-South Assistance: Dr. Paul G. Harris and 
Will They be Applied to 1宜V/AIDS? Dr. Patricia Siplon 
114 (8/01) CPPS “One Country, Two Systerns" in Practice: An Dr. Wong Yiu-chung 
Analysis of Six Cases 
115 (9/01) CAPS 中國自由貿易區的構想-WTO框架下中國 遲福林教授
大陸與港 、 澳、台經貿關係展望
116 (10/01) CAPS Economic Reforrns and Growth Prospects in Professor Lawrence R. Klein 
India and Dr. Thangavel Palanivel 
117 (1102) CAPS 加入 WTO對台灣製造業的衝擊微觀分析 陳信宏博士、史惠慈博士
118 (2/02) CAPS 中國大陸加入世賀組織對大陸經濟發展之影 回君美博士
響
119 (3 /02) CAPS 入世後瓊台農業項下自由賀易展望 李昌邦教授
120 (4/02) CAPS 兩岸入世質後智慧財產權爭議解決之探討 王琇慧女士
121 (5 /02) CAPS 台灣入世銀行服務業在法規和政策上之調適 王應傑先生
122 (6/02) CAPS 加入 WTO對台灣與大陸證券業之衝擊與因 吳佳燕博士
應
123 (7/02) CAPS 兩岸工業部門國際分工程度之比較分析 吳中峻博士
124 (8/02) CAPS 兩岸入會後的金融新情勢 薛琦教授
No. Z盟k Åuthor 
125 (9/02) CAPS 世質組織與賀易相關投資措施協定與跨國投 王泰銓教授、楊士慧女士
資之規定問題
126 (1 0/02) CAPS 中國大陸加入 WTO後政府職能之變遷 . 調 陳德昇博士
適與挑戰
127 (1 1102) CPPS Competition Policy under Laissez-faireism: Professor Edward K. Y 
Market Power and Its Treatment in Hong Kong Chen and Dr. Ping Lin 
128 (1 2/02) CPPS R&D in China and the lmplications for Dr. PingLin 
lndustrial Restructuring 
129 (1 3/02) CPPS Education Reform: An Economic Perspective Professor Lok Sang Ho 
130 (1 4/02) CAPS Do China and Hong Kong Constitute An Dr. Yue Ma and 
Optimum Currency Area? Professor Shu-ki Tsang 
131 (15/02) CAPS Dirty Coal: Voluntary International Paul G. Harris and 
Environmental Agreements and Sustainable Chihiro Udagawa 
Development in the People's Republic of China 
132 (16/02) CAPS Spillover Effects ofFDI on lnnovation in China: Cheung Kui-yin and 
An Analysis of Provincial Data Ping Lin 
133 (1 7/02) CAPS Competition Policy in East Asia: The Cases of Ping Lin 
Japan, People's Republic of China, and Hong 
Kong 
134 (1 /03) CPPS On the Equivalence ofthe Noncooperative and YueMa 
Cooperative Solutions in a Two-Person Game 
135 (2/03) CPPS Education Reform in HK: The Ideal versus the Lok Sang Ho 
Reality about Competition 
136 (3/03) CAPS US-Japan Relations: sCt-oSnevpetregmenbcee r and Brian Bridges 
Divergel1ce in the Post-Sëptember 11 tb Wor1d 
137 (4/03) CAPS The Role ofNon-judicial Mechanisms in Ren Yue 
Protecting lndividual Rights: The China and 
Hong Kong Experiences 
138 (5/03) CAPS Institutional Disarticulation: The Changing Anita Y.K. Poon and 
Educational Governance in Post-Handover W ong Yiu-chung 
HongKong 
139 (6/03) CPPS The Effect ofTrade on Wage Inequality: The Lok Sang Ho, Xiangdong Wei 
Hong Kong Case and Gary Wai-chung W ong 
No. Z且i主 Author 
140 (7/03) CPPS Structural Change and the Narrowing Gender C. Simon Fan and 
Gap in Wages: Theory and Evidence from Hong Hon-Kwong Lui 
Kong 
141 (8/03) CPPS Managers' Occupational Stress in China: The Chang-qin Lu, Oi-ling Siu and 
Role of Self-efficacy Cary L. Cooper 
142 (9/03) CAPS Societal Stability and Political Reform: Chinese Wong Yiu-chung 
Politics in the 1990s 
143 (1 0/03) CPPS The Nexus between Housing and the Macro Lok Sang Ho and 
Economy: Hong Kong as a Case Study Gary Wai-chung Wong 
144 (1 1103) CAPS Yesterday's Lei Feng and Today's Young Che-po Chan 
People's Liberation Army Soldiers 
145 (1 2/03) CPPS A New (and Old) Macroeconomic Policy Lok Sang Ho 
Framework 
146 (Jan 04) CAPS The Economic ChaIlenges for the New Chinese Yue Ma (馬躍) and 
Leadership Wang Ping (王平)
147 (Feb 04) CAPS China's Domestic and Internationa1 Policies on Paul G. Harris and 
Global Warming: Explanations and Assessment Yu Hong)心血
A fulllist ofworking papers ti t1es is also available at the Centre homepages 
htφ://www.LN. edu. hklcaps/ and http://www.LNedu.hkJcpps/ 
香港屯門
嶺商大學
亞洲太平洋研究中心
Centre for Asian Pacific Studies 
Lingnan University 
Tuen Mun, Hong !(ong 
Tel: (852) 2616 7427 
Fax: (852) 2465 5786 
